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Introduction
This paper studies externalities of national decisions on health policy, in particular changes in coinsurance rates (patients pay a percentage of the price), under pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. trade outside the manufacturer's authorized distribution channel, in a two-country model with a vertical distributor relationship. This analysis is motivated by the con ‡ict between the consequences of parallel trade, namely market integration, and national competence in price regulation and reimbursement rules in the European Union.
On the one hand, the prevalence of pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. wholesalers or parallel traders being allowed to import pharmaceuticals from other countries without the permission of the manufacturer, is the result of market integration, in the European Union the internal & Mahon (2003) who included the top-selling products plus a random sample of 150 products in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK observe indirect competitive e¤ects in the parallel importing countries.
A more recent study by Granlund & Köksal analyzes Swedish drug prices for the period 2003 to 2007. They …nd that on average, drugs facing competition from parallel imports are priced at 17%-21% less as compared to what their prices would be if they had never faced such competition (Granlund & Köksal, 2011) . Examining 1994-2003 data on prices of molecules that treat cardiovascular disease in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Timur, Picone & DeSimone (2010) suggest that cross-country di¤erences between Germany and three of four other sample countries (France, Italy, Spain) have declined. They conclude that the European Union has come closer to achieving a single pharmaceutical market. Kyle, Allsbrook & Schulman (2008) who study the prices over 1000 pharmaceutical products in 30 countries over a 12-year period (1993-2004 ) also …nd that price di¤erences have decreased in the European Union, where parallel trade is legal. But they also …nd that price di¤erences have decreased less in countries of the European Union than in non-European Union countries, where parallel trade is not allowed.
Irrespective of whether parallel trade results in price convergence or not, price di¤erences are a precondition for parallel trade. The pro…tability of performing cross-country arbitrage depends on substantial price di¤erences. As mentioned above, these price di¤erences may stem from a pharmaceutical manufacturer's price discrimination between di¤erent countries and/or di¤erences in wholesale prices. In addition, di¤erent national pharmaceutical regulations in the individual member states may give rise to pharmaceutical price di¤erences (Kanavos et al., 2004; Enemark et al., 2006) . The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art. 168, provides for national competence of member states in determining health policy, which includes the general organization of health care systems as well as pharmaceutical price regulation and cost-sharing systems.
So far, harmonization of di¤erent European rules has primarily concerned drug authorization procedures (Kyle; 2009 ). In 1995, two procedures were established, the Mutual Recognition Procedure (following approval in one reference member state a …rm may launch the drug in other member states without additional applications) and approval by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (European Union-wide approval) (Kyle, 2009) . With respect to pharmaceutical price regulation and reimbursement, Directive 89/195/EC (so called Price Transparency Directive) is the only existing measure (Hancher, 2004) . Originally, it was intended as a …rst, but retrospectively is the last measure with the objective of harmonizing national price regulation and reimbursement rules (Hancher; 2004) . It provides rules for the control of pharmaceutical prices (respective measures have to be e¢cient, transparent and fair) amongst others (Desogus, 2011; Hancher, 2004) . Among the member states, agreements on further harmonization could not be reached, although price di¤erences have been considered as distortions (Desogus, 2011; Hancher, 2004) . Consequently, drugs pricing -pharmaceutical price regulation and reimburse-ment rules -remain under exclusive national competence (Desogus, 2011) . Given that direct harmonization of these rules is politically impossible, the European Commission has switched to soft law tools in recent years, pursuing price harmonization indirectly through trade liberalization, while regulation remains at a national level (Desogus, 2011) . From the European Court of Justice's line of case law, it is clear that di¤erences between national health care systems are not considered as obstacle to the free movement of goods (Desogus, 2011) .
Regional exhaustion of property rights and the free movement of goods allow wholesalers or parallel traders to import pharmaceuticals from other countries without the authorization of the manufacturer, while health policy, including pharmaceutical price regulation and cost-sharing instruments, is in the national competence of member states. This implies that not only the manufacturer's pricing decisions but also national decisions on health policy may be interdependent. Externalities may emerge, whereby decisions about pharmaceutical price regulation and cost-sharing instruments in one country have an e¤ect on drug prices and public health expenditure in other countries as well.
The implications of policy choices at the national level in a setting of markets being integrated by parallel trade have been analyzed by Raimondos-Møller & Schmitt (2010) for tax systems. They examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports when governments decide non-cooperatively on tax rates. They show that for an increasing volume of parallel imports origin taxes converge, while destination taxes diverge.
This paper studies externalities of national decisions in pharmaceutical policy, when markets are integrated by parallel trade. In particular, it shows that changes in coinsurance rates (patients pay a proportion of the drug price, health insurance reimburses the remainder) in one country have an impact on patients and health insurances in another country. Coinsurance rates are a cost-sharing instrument, which intends to restrict moral hazard in utilization of health services. Their design takes several health policy objectives into account: public health expenditure should be limited, but access to pharmaceuticals should be granted and there should be no excessive …nancial exposure of patients. When regulatory bodies set coinsurance rates in a setting of markets being integrated by parallel trade, they do not only have to balance these objectives for the respective country, but should also consider the impact on patients and health expenditure in other countries.
I analyze these externalities of coinsurance changes in a two-country model inspired by Maskus & Chen (2002) and Chen & Maskus (2005) . It assumes a manufacturer that sells an innovative drug in two markets. In the home market, consumers purchase the drug directly from the manufacturer. In the foreign market the manufacturer markets the drug through an intermediary, which may engage in parallel trade and re-sell the drug in the home market. Parallel trade occurs as a by-product of the vertical control structure in the foreign country and ‡ows from the foreign country as the source country to the home country as the destination country. When there is no parallel trade, the manufacturer's optimal strategy is to set a low wholesale price and extract the wholesaler's pro…t via a …xed fee to avoid the double marginalization problem arising from the intermediary's market power. However, in the presence of parallel trade, a low wholesale price induces more parallel trade. Consequently, the manufacturer may want to set the wholesale price higher in order to limit competition from parallel trade. The optimal wholesale price re ‡ects the trade-o¤ between an intensi…ed double marginalization problem in the foreign market for a high wholesale price and increased competition from parallel trade in the home market due to a low wholesale price.
Parallel trade generates a competition e¤ect in the destination country, resulting in lower drug prices and a higher quantity sold. The higher wholesale price (as compared to segmented markets) creates a double-marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price and a lower quantity sold. These results are also in line with Ganslandt & Maskus (2007) . Parallel trade results in market integration, as it makes pricing decisions with respect to the di¤erent markets interdependent. In this setting, national decisions on coinsurance rates a¤ect the trade-o¤ between the double marginalization e¤ect and the competition e¤ect. By changes in the wholesale price, externalities occur. An increase of the coinsurance rate in the destination country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country (lower drug price, higher quantity); an increase of the coinsurance rate in the source country reinforces the competition e¤ect from parallel trade in the destination country (lower drug prices, higher quantities).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the two-country model with a vertical distributor relationship is presented and the case of segmented markets, when parallel trade is not allowed, and the case of integrated markets, when parallel trade is possible, are analyzed. In Section 3, the e¤ects of parallel trade with respect to drug prices and price convergence are studied. Section 4 examines the implications of changes of cost-sharing instruments in the destination country for the source country and vice versa, section 5 discusses implications for health policy. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Following Maskus & Chen (2002) , (2005), consider a (domestic) manufacturer M selling a brandname drug b in two countries, in its home country and a foreign country. In the home country, the manufacturer sells directly to the consumers; in the foreign country, it sells through an independent intermediary I. The manufacturer follows a two-part pricing strategy, it charges the intermediary a wholesale price w and a …xed fee .
In a regime of international exhaustion of intellectual property rights, due to lack of complete vertical control, the intermediary may engage in parallel trade and resell the drug in the home country . The sales of the drug as a parallel import are denoted by . That is, the foreign country is the source country of the parallel import and the home country is the destination country. Therefore, the home country will be denoted as country D and the foreign country as country S.
While consumers in the source country S buy the drug from the intermediary, consumers in the destination country D have the choice between the locally sourced version b when purchasing from the manufacturer and the parallel import when buying from the intermediary. Consumers associate a lower quality with the parallel import, which is captured by a discount factor in consumer valuation. The perception of parallel imports as qualitatively inferior results from di¤erences in appearance and packaging (Maskus, 2000) . In addition, following Schmalensee (1982) , uncertainty regarding product characteristics can be translated into quality di¤erentials. If consumers are not sure whether the parallel import is identical with the locally sourced version of the drug, their willingness to pay for the parallel import will be lower and the intermediary must o¤er a price reduction in order to convince consumers to try and learn about the parallel import. Moreover, there is evidence that the price of a drug may serve as a quality indicator (Waber et al., 2008) . Accordingly, due to a lower price, the parallel import may be associated with lower quality. Consumers in both countries are heterogeneous with respect to the gross valuation of drug treatment, represented by a parameter which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1]. Thus, the total mass of consumers is given by 1 in both countries..
Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the most preferred drug. The utility derived from no drug consumption is zero, while a consumer who buys one unit of drug i obtains a net utility
where 2 (0; 1) re ‡ects the perceived quality di¤erence between both versions b and of the drug, j 2 (0; 1) is the coinsurance rate in country j (j = D; S), and p i;j is the price of drug i in country j. For = 1, consumers associate no value at all with the parallel import, for = 0, both products are homogenous and are thus considered perfect substitutes. A consumer with a positive net utility of drug consumption will choose the most preferred drug version by trading o¤ perceived drug quality against drug copayment. The higher the gross valuation of drug treatment , the more the consumer is willing to pay in order to purchase the (high-quality) locally sourced drug. The consumer heterogeneity with respect to valuation can be interpreted as di¤erences in willingness to pay for a locally sourced version, di¤erences in risk aversion regarding the trial of substitutes or di¤erences in the severity of the condition or di¤erences in prescription practices (see e.g. Brekke, Holmas & Straume, 2010) .
Health insurance reimburses a fraction of the drug price, the remaining fraction is paid by the patient. Thus, the e¤ective price of the drug to the patient amounts to the proportion of the market price set by the manufacturer or intermediary (Zweifel et al., 2009 ).
If parallel trade is not allowed (regime of national exhaustion of intellectual property rights), only the locally sourced version is available in country D. The marginal consumer who is in-di¤erent between buying the locally sourced version directly from the manufacturer (b) or not purchasing at all (0), has a gross valuation b;0 D , given by
Hence, in country D, if the parallel import is not available, demand for b is given by
If parallel trade takes place, consumers in country D have the choice between the locally sourced version (b) (directly) from the manufacturer or the parallel import ( ) from the intermediary. The marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the locally sourced version b and the parallel import has a gross valuation b; D , given by
An asterisk is used to denote variables associated with parallel trade. A consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the parallel import ( ) and not buying at all (0) has a gross valuation ;0 D , given by ;0
Consequently, in country D, if the parallel import is available, demands for the authorized product b and for the parallel import , respectively, are given by
In country S, the brand-name drug is only sold by the intermediary. A consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the drug and not buying has a gross valuation b;0 S , given by
Accordingly, in country S demand for the authorized product b is given by
Production technologies exhibit constant marginal costs, which are normalized to zero for simplicity. It is assumed that parallel trade is costless.
The structure of the model can be summarized by the following two-stage game: In the …rst stage, the manufacturer speci…es a wholesale price w and …xed fee . In the second and …nal stage, the intermediary sets the price in country S (that is, p b;S ) and the price for the parallel import in country D (namely p ;D ), while the manufacturer sets the price for the locally sourced version in country D (that is, p b;D ).
Equilibrium without Parallel Trade
First consider the case where parallel trade is not allowed and markets are segmented. Both pricing decisions by the manufacturer -the drug price in country D and the wholesale price w that determines the drug price in country S -are independent.
The manufacturers pro…t is given as
where b;D denotes the monopoly pro…t from direct sales in country D, w b the wholesale pro…t from the intermediary's sales in market S, and the …xed fee that is used to extract the intermediary's pro…t. The wholesaler's total pro…t is given as
where b;S denotes the pro…t from sales in country S. In market D, the manufacturer M sets the monopoly drug price
In market S, the intermediary I charges the monopoly drug price p b;S = (1+w S ) 2 S . The drug price p b;S increases in the wholesale price w.
Turning to the second stage of the game, the manufacturer M sets
in order to extract the intermediary's pro…t. In the absence of parallel trade and for segmented markets, the manufacturer's optimal strategy is to set the wholesale price equal to the marginal cost of production, i.e. w = 0 3 . This pricing decision avoids the double marginalization problem and results in the same drug price and sales volume as if the manufacturer sold directly to the consumers. Equilibrium drug prices are
Prices decrease in coinsurance rates. E¤ective prices for consumers ( D p b;D = 1 2 , S p b;S = 1 2 ) are equivalent to prices without insurance coverage (p b;D = 1 2 , p b;S = 1 2 ). That is, the e¤ect 3 Substituting (11) and equilibrium prices into (9) and maximizing with respect to w results in w = 0. 8 from reimbursement by health insurance is completely appropriated by the manufacturer. Price di¤erences across countries result from di¤erences in health care systems, i.e. coinsurance rates, only:
That is, if S > D , country D is the high price-country and country S is the low price-country. Equilibrium quantities are
Quantities are independent of coinsurance rates, as the e¤ect from reimbursement completely accrues to the manufacturer. Health insurance refunds the fraction (1 D ) of the monopoly drug price p b;D per drug. Accordingly, in country D, public health expenditure amounts to
Similarly, in country S, the fraction (1 S ) of the drug price p b;S is reimbursed per drug and public health expenditure is given as
Equilibrium with Parallel Trade
If parallel trade is allowed, the manufacturer's pricing decisions -the drug price in country D and the wholesale price charged in country S -are no longer independent. A low wholesale price induces parallel imports sold by the intermediary in country D (the wholesale price constitutes the lower price bound for the intermediary). Increasing the wholesale price in response creates and aggravates a double marginalization problem in country S. Consequently, if parallel trade is allowed, the choice of the wholesale price re ‡ects the trade-o¤ between an aggravated double marginalization problem in country S and intensi…ed competition from parallel trade in country D.
The manufacturer's pro…t is given as
(17) where b denotes the pro…t from direct sale in D, w b the wholesale pro…t from the intermediary's sales in market S, w the wholesale pro…t from the intermediary's sales as parallel imports in market D, and the …xed fee. Again, an asterisk is used to denote variables associated with parallel trade.
Parallel trade a¤ects the manufacturer's pro…t in three ways: First, he faces competition by the intermediary in market D. Second, for a given wholesale price, the …xed fee extracted from the intermediary is higher, as it now also contains the intermediary's pro…t from parallel trade. Third, the intermediary's sales as reimports result in additional wholesale pro…t for the manufacturer. The intermediary's pro…t is given by
where b;S denotes the pro…t from sales in S and ;D the pro…t from sales as parallel imports in market D.
In country D, the manufacturer M maximizes (17) with respect to p b;D : The …rst order condition of this problem is
which yields the best response function p b;D = 2 D + 1 2 p ;D + w . Compared to the …rst order condition for segmented markets, part I and consequently p b;D are higher (lower) under parallel
). Part II of the …rst order condition di¤ers by the factor 1 from the …rst order condition without parallel trade. For 0 < < 1, part II and consequently p b;D are lower under parallel trade. Part III illustrates the indirect e¤ect of competition from parallel trade: A larger volume of parallel imports results in a higher wholesale pro…t. A higher wholesale price results in a higher price for the locally sourced version, as it leads to less competition from parallel trade.
The intermediary maximizes (18) with respect to p ;D and p b;S . The …rst order condition with respect to p ;D is
and the best response function is p ;
. In country S, the intermediary maximizes (18) with respect to p b;S . The …rst order condition 10 to this maximization problem is
resulting in the price
. The …rst order condition is identical to the …rst order condition, if parallel trade is not allowed. Note that as p b;S increases in the wholesale price w ,
the manufacturer extracts the intermediary's total pro…t. Substituting (22) and equilibrium prices into (17) and maximizing with respect to w gives the wholesale price:
For segmented markets, the manufacturer's optimal strategy to avoid the double marginalization problem resulting from vertical separation in imperfectly competitive markets is to set the wholesale price equal to marginal cost, i.e. w = 0. However, if parallel trade is allowed and results in market integration, a low wholesale price induces more parallel trade. Consequently, the manufacturer will set a higher wholesale price to limit competition from parallel trade in country D. The optimal wholesale price w re ‡ects the trade-o¤ between an aggravated double marginalization problem in country S and intensi…ed competition in country D.
Equilibrium drug prices are
and
Equilibrium quantities are
In the destination country, public drug expenditure is given as
and in the source country, public drug expenditure is given as
The E¤ect of Parallel Trade
This section investigates the e¤ect of parallel trade on drug prices and quantities in the destination country and the source country. In addition, it explores whether cross-country arbitrage results in the erosion of price di¤erences, i.e. price convergence.
Competition E¤ect in the Destination Country
In country D, parallel trade induces a competition e¤ect with lower drug prices and a higher quantity sold, see Appendix A for details. Compared to segmented markets, competition from parallel trade reduces the price of the drug sold directly by the manufacturer:
with the price of the parallel import being lower than the price of the locally sourced version:
The di¤erence between the prices of the two versions of the drug stems from (perceived) vertical product di¤erentiation: The intermediary has to compensate consumers for the lower (perceived) quality by pricing at a certain discount from a given price of the locally sourced drug version 4 . Accordingly, under parallel trade, the prices of both versions of the drug are lower than the monopoly drug price under segmented markets.
The quantity of the locally sourced version is higher under parallel trade:
Consequently, the total quantity of the drug available, that is, the quantity of the locally sourced version plus the parallel import, is higher than the monopoly quantity under segmented markets.
Double Marginalization E¤ect in the Source Country
In country S, parallel trade generates a double marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price and a lower quantity due to an increase of the wholesale price, see Appendix A for details. Compared to segmented markets, the wholesale price w is higher under parallel trade. As a low wholesale price induces more parallel trade and consequently enhances the competition from parallel trade in the destination country D, the manufacturer raises the wholesale price in order to deter parallel trade partially:
The increase of the wholesale price induced by parallel trade translates to an increase of the drug price:
and the higher price reduces the quantity sold:
Price Convergence vs. Divergence
Parallel trade results in price convergence if it goes from the ex-ante low price country to the ex-ante high price country (i.e. if the pre-parallel trade drug price in the source country S is lower than the pre-parallel trade price in the destination country D 5 ), see Appendix A for details:
The intuition is quite simple: If parallel trade goes from the low-price to the high price country, the double marginalization e¤ect results in a higher price in the low price country and the competition e¤ect lowers the price in the destination country, both reducing the price spread. On the contrary, if parallel trade goes from a high price to a low price country, it results in price divergence, as the double marginalization e¤ect contributes to an even higher price in the high price country and the competition e¤ect lowers the low price in the destination country. Although there is also evidence for parallel trade from high-price to low-price countries, the bulk of parallel trade goes from low-price to high-price countries.
Policy Interdependence under Parallel Trade
This section investigates externalities of national health policy decisions on prices and quantities in the respective other country. In other words, this section analyzes pharmaceutical policy interdependence under parallel trade. Under segmented markets, there are no externalities of changes in coinsurance rates, as the manufacturer's pricing decisions in both markets are independent, see Appendix B for details.
As the reduction of rising health expenditure is one of the main objectives of pharmaceutical policy in many European countries, I analyze changes of cost-sharing instruments with the aim to reduce public expenditure. This corresponds to the reduction of reimbursed amounts and increases of copayments, more speci…cally increases of coinsurance rates. In the case of reductions of copayments, i.e. reductions of coinsurance rates, price and quantity changes go in the opposite direction.
Change of the Coinsurance Rate in the Destination Country
Consider …rst a change of the cost-sharing instrument in the destination country and its implications for the source country.
An increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country D raises e¤ective consumer prices, lowers the quantity consumed, and reduces health expenditure in the destination country D and lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed, and raises health expenditure in the source country S. For explicit expressions of changes in prices and quantities, see Appendix C.
In the destination country, the increase of copayments, i.e. the increase of the coinsurance rate results in lower drug prices and lower quantities sold.
An increase of the coinsurance rate in country D increases the price elasticity of demand. As willingness to pay decreases, demand for the locally sourced version of the drug decreases c.p.:
Consequently, the manufacturer lowers the price for the locally sourced version of the drug, as illustrated by the best response function: p b;D = 1 2 D + p ;D + w . For the parallel import, demand increases, if the price di¤erence between the locally sourced version and the parallel import exceeds the quality di¤erence:
The direct e¤ect of the price for the locally sourced version on the price for the parallel import, however, leads to a decrease of the price for the parallel import as well 6 . This is demonstrated 6 In addition, 39 implies that the intermediary has to lower p ;H in order to prevent a decrease of demand.
14 by the best response function: p ;D = 1 2 w + p b;D (1 ) . Accordingly, in country D both drug prices decrease in the coinsurance rate:
Higher price elasticity under parallel trade of demand limits the ability to increase prices in response to an increase of the coinsurance rate and consequently, e¤ective consumer prices increase:
As price decreases cannot compensate the e¤ect of lower demand, quantities of both versions of the drug decrease in D :
Lower prices and lower quantities consumed reduce the public health expenditure:
Spillovers of copayment changes in country D to the source country S occur via the wholesale price, as the manufacturer's pricing decisions are interdependent under parallel trade. Representing the intermediary's marginal cost, the wholesale price is the lower bound for the drug price in country S and the price of the parallel import in country D. With respect to country S, a lower wholesale price is preferable for the manufacturer (limiting the double marginalization e¤ect), with respect to country D, a higher wholesale price is in the interest of the manufacturer (limiting competition from parallel trade). The resulting wholesale price represents a trade-o¤ between competition in D and double marginalization e¤ect in S, with competition in D inducing an upward in ‡uence on the wholesale price and the successive monopoly position of the manufacturer and the intermediary in country S exerting downward pressure on the wholesale price. Although decreasing drug prices in country D could be considered as intensifying competition, the decrease of total demand reduces the e¤ect of competition. The double marginalization e¤ect gains relative importance and, accordingly, the wholesale price is lowered:
The drug price in country S is a mark-up over the intermediary's marginal cost, which is the wholesale price w. (The intermediary's best response function is p b;S = 1+w S 2 S ). A decrease of the wholesale price then results in drug price decreases:
As the coinsurance rate in the source country S is unchanged, the e¤ective drug price decreases:
which increases the quantity consumed:
Thus, for increasing copayments in country D, the decrease of total demand reduces the relative importance of competition by parallel trade and the wholesale price is lowered, translating to a lower drug price and higher quantity sold in the source country S. In other words, the reduction of the competition by parallel trade enables the manufacturer to more follow the optimal strategy of setting a low wholesale price to avoid excessive mark-ups in the successive monopoly of manufacturer and intermediary. That is, a copayment increase in the destination country D mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country S.
Health expenditure increases, as the e¤ect from a higher quantity consumed exceeds the e¤ect of a lower drug price (see Appendix D):
Consequently, an increase of the coinsurance rate in the destination country D decreases demand and accordingly the importance of the competition from parallel imports, which results in a decrease of the wholesale price. This reduces marginal cost for the intermediary, which translates to a price reduction for the drug in the source country S and increase of the quantity consumed. By reducing drug prices and increasing the quantities sold, a copayment increase in the source country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country S.
Proposition 1 summarizes the e¤ect of an increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country D:
Proposition 1 An increase in the coinsurance rate in the destination country D i) raises e¤ective consumer prices, lowers the quantity consumed, and reduces health expenditure in country D, ii) lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed in, and raises health expenditure in country S.
Change of the Coinsurance Rate in the Source Country
Consider now a change of the cost-sharing instrument in the source country and its implications for the destination country.
An increase in the coinsurance rate in the source country S raises e¤ective consumer prices, lowers the quantity consumed and reduces health expenditure in the source country S and lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed and lowers health expenditure in the destination country country D. For explicit expressions of changes in prices and quantities see Appendix C.
In the source country, the increase of copayments, i.e. an increase of the coinsurance rate results, similarly to the e¤ects in the destination country, in lower drug prices and lower quantities sold.
As willingness to pay decreases, demand for the drug decreases c.p.:
The intermediary then reduces the drug price in response, as illustrated by the best response function p b;S = 1+w S 2 S . Accordingly, the drug price decreases in S :
The e¤ective drug price increases, as marginal cost is no longer zero 7 :
As the price decrease does not o¤set the e¤ect of an increase of the copayment and thus, under coinsurance rates, the quantity consumed also decreases:
Graph 1 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase of the coinsurance rate for marginal cost greater than zero. Let D ( = 0:2) denote the demand curve for a coinsurance rate of = 0:2 and M R ( = 0:2) the corresponding marginal revenue curve. Similarly, let D ( = 0:25) and M R ( = 0:25) denote the demand curve and marginal revenue curve respectively for a coinsurance rate of = 0:25. An increase of the coinsurance rate from = 0:2 to = 0:25 increases price elasticity of demand for all positive prices and quantities (inward turn of the demand curve) and makes the manufacturer lower the price from p to p 0 . As marginal cost is not zero, the price decrease cannot compensate the e¤ect from higher price elasticity and the quantity sold decreases. The intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue does not coincide with the x-axis, as marginal cost is greater than zero. Thus, the dimension of the intersection of marginal cost and marginal revenue depends on the coinsurance rate, i.e. the price elasticity of demand, as graph 1 shows. In other words, as the e¤ective consumer price increases with the coinsurance rate, the quantity 7 Note that
That is, if w = 0, the e¤ective consumer price is independent of the coinsurance rate; if w > 0, an increase of the coinsurance rate implies an increase of the e¤ective consumer price. Thus, similar to the e¤ect of an increase of the copayment in country D on drug prices and quantities in country D, the increase of the copayment in country S results in a lower drug price and a lower quantity sold, which decreases health expenditure:
Spillovers of copayment changes in country S to the destination country D again occur via the wholesale price. Since the e¤ective drug price increases in the wholesale price and accordingly, the quantity sold decreases in the wholesale price, a higher wholesale price aggravates the double marginalization e¤ect. Consequently, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price:
In country D, the price of the parallel import is a mark-up over the intermediary's marginal cost, which is the wholesale price w : p ;D = 1 2 w + p b;D (1 ) . Consequently, a decrease of the wholesale price results in a lower price for the parallel import. This induces the manufacturer to reduce also the price for the locally sourced version of the drug in order not to lose too many consumers to the parallel import, as illustrated by the best response function: p b;D = 1 2 + p ;D + w . Accordingly, in country D, both drug prices decrease in the coinsurance rate in the source country:
E¤ective drug prices decrease, as the coinsurance rate in destination country D is unchanged
A drug price decrease and an unchanged coinsurance rate increases the quantity sold:
As the e¤ect of lower prices more than o¤sets the e¤ect of a higher quantity, public health expenditure decreases (see Appendix D):
Thus, an increase of the copayment in the source country S increases the extent and accordingly the importance of the double marginalization e¤ect, which results in a decrease of the wholesale price. This reduces marginal cost for the intermediary, which translates to a price reduction for the parallel import and then, as prices are strategic complements, also to a price reduction for the locally sourced version of the drug. By reducing drug prices and increasing the quantities sold, a copayment increase in the source country reinforces the e¤ect of competition by parallel trade in country D.
Proposition 2 summarizes the e¤ect of an increase in the coinsurance rate in the source country S: Proposition 2 An increase in the coinsurance rate in the source country S i) raises e¤ective consumer prices, lowers the quantity consumed and reduces health expenditure in country S, ii) lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed and lowers health expenditure in country D.
Implications for Health Policy
This section investigates the implications of the externalities of national decisions for health policy.
When markets are integrated through parallel trade and pricing decisions are interdependent, national decisions on coinsurance rates result in spillovers to the respective other country. By changing prices and volume, national decisions also have an e¤ect on (potential) objectives of health policy 8 , namely public pharmaceutical expenditure and consumer surplus.
A change of the coinsurance rate in the destination country D results in a mitigation of the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country S. By lowering the drug price and increasing the quantity consumed, this increases consumer surplus and increases public pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country. A change of the coinsurance rate in the source country S reinforces the e¤ect of competition by parallel trade in the destination country D, where drug prices are reduced and the quantity consumed is increased. This increases consumer surplus and reduces public pharmaceutical expenditure in the destination country.
Given that coinsurance rates are the result of a political optimization, balancing di¤erent health policy objectives, a change of the coinsurance rate in one country might induce a change of the coinsurance rate in the respective other country. Consequently, there might be an incentive for one government to modify the coinsurance rate, following a change of the coinsurance rate by the other government.
Non-coordinated Health Policy
Consider …rst the case of governments setting coinsurance rates in a non-coordinated way and without taking the externalities for the respective other country into account. Assume that countries set coinsurance rates to maximize local welfare.
In the destination country D, welfare is given as the sum of consumer surplus and the manufacturer's pro…t 9 net of public pharmaceutical expenditure:
in the source country S, welfare is consumer surplus net of public pharmaceutical expenditure:
Maximizing W D with respect to D and W S with respect to S yields the best response functions c D ( S ) and c S ( D ), see Appendix E. Numerical simulations yield no equilibrium for D 2 (0; 1) and S 2 (0; 1). This implies that a modi…cation of the coinsurance rate in one country triggers a change in the respective other country as well. In addition, coinsurance rates are ine¢cient from a global perspective: Without taking the externalities for the source country into account, the country D-regulatory body sets a coinsurance rate not su¢ciently high with respect to consumer surplus in the source country and it chooses a rate not su¢ciently low with respect to public pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country. If the country S-regulatory body sets the coinsurance rate without considering the externality to the destination country D, it chooses a rate not su¢ciently high. From a consumer surplus perspective, a coordination of pharmaceutical policy would imply higher coinsurance rates as compared to national pharmaceutical policy. From a public pharmaceutical expenditure perspective, the coordination of pharmaceutical policy would imply a lower coinsurance rate in the destination country D and a higher coinsurance rate in the source country S as compared to national pharmaceutical policy.
Coordinated Health Policy
Assume that governments in both countries set coinsurance rates to maximize total welfare. Total welfare, i.e. W = W D + W S , strictly increases in D and decreases in S , see Appendix E. Thus, total welfare is maximized for
This implies that there is no reimbursement in the destination country and patients pay the full drug price out-of-pocket. This reduces public pharmaceutical expenditure, but it also reduces consumer surplus by increasing …nancial exposure and reducing access to pharmaceuticals. In the source country, patients pay only a very small fraction of the market price, which increases consumer surplus, but it also increases public pharmaceutical expenditure. This illustrates that the coordination of pharmaceutical policy does not imply identical coinsurance rates in both countries, i.e. coordination of pharmaceutical policy does not result in harmonization of coinsurance rates. Also, this implies that the con ‡ict between di¤erent health policy objectives -reduction of public health expenditure and distributive objectives -remains and cannot be resolved through the coordination of pharmaceutical policy. Starting from these coordinated coinsurance rates, regulatory bodies can improve local welfare by changing the coinsurance rate, c D ( S = 0) 6 = 1 and c S ( D = 1) 6 = 0, see Appendix E. This is, there is the incentive for regulatory bodies to deviate from the coordinated coinsurance rates and modify the coinsurance rate.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied the externalities of national decisions on health policy, more precisely changes in coinsurance rates.
Parallel trade generates a competition e¤ect in the destination country, resulting in lower drug prices and a higher quantity sold. The higher wholesale price (as compared to segmented markets) creates a double-marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price and a lower quantity sold. Parallel trade results in market integration, as it makes pricing decisions with respect to the di¤erent markets interdependent. In this setting, national decisions on coinsurance rates a¤ect the trade-o¤ between the double marginalization e¤ect and the competition e¤ect. By changes in the wholesale price, externalities occur. An increase of the coinsurance rate in the destination country mitigates the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country; an increase of the coinsurance rate in the source country reinforces the competition e¤ect from parallel trade in the destination country.
The interdependence of pharmaceutical policy under parallel trade may pose a number of problems and questions which need to be addressed.
First, these externalities may generate a frequent and ongoing adjustment of coinsurance rates. For instance, if the destination country increases the coinsurance rate, this increases public pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country, which then may trigger a coinsurance rate increase by the respective regulator in the source country as well. Second, coinsurance rate decreases may have adverse e¤ects: Coinsurance rate decreases in the destination country aggravate the double marginalization e¤ect in the source country. Coinsurance rate decreases in the source country weaken the competition e¤ect in the destination country. Third, the change of the coinsurance rate in the destination country induces a con ‡ict between the health policy objectives of reduction of public pharmaceutical expenditure and distributive objectives in the source country: A decrease of the coinsurance rate in the destination country reduces public pharmaceutical expenditure in the source country, but increases …nancial exposure of patients and worsens access to pharmaceuticals at the same time.
Consequently, this may present a case for policy coordination in the European Union. In this model, there might be an incentive for one government to modify the coinsurance rate, following a change of the coinsurance rate by the other government. Thus, a multilateral agreement on pharmaceutical policy may be desirable. However, it must be taken into account that this may aggravate the con ‡ict between the reduction of public pharmaceutical expenditure and distributive objectives in health policy. In addition, given that EU countries di¤er in income per capita, …nancing of health insurance, culture etc. this may pose additional problems.
Appendix A: The E¤ect of Parallel Trade Competition E¤ect in the Destination Country
In country D, parallel trade induces a competition e¤ect with lower drug prices and a higher quantity sold.
Compared to segmented markets, competition from parallel trade reduces the price of the drug sold directly by the manufacturer:
The di¤erence between the prices of the two versions of the drug stems from (perceived) vertical product di¤erentiation: The intermediary has to compensate consumers for the lower (perceived) quality by pricing at a certain discount from a given price of the locally sourced drug version 10 . Accordingly, under parallel trade, the prices of both versions of the drug are lower than the monopoly drug price under segmented markets.
Double Marginalization E¤ect in the Source Country
In country S, parallel trade generates a double marginalization e¤ect with a higher drug price and a lower quantity due to an increase of the wholesale price. Compared to segmented markets, the wholesale price w is higher under parallel trade. As a low wholesale price induces more parallel trade and consequently enhances the competition from parallel trade in the destination country D, the manufacturer raises the wholesale price in order to deter parallel trade partially:
The increase of the wholesale price induced by parallel trade translates to an increase of the drug and the higher price reduces the quantity sold:
Price Convergence vs. Divergence
Parallel trade results in price convergence, if it goes from the ex-ante low price country to the ex-ante high price country (i.e. if the pre-parallel trade drug price in the source country S is lower than the pre-parallel trade price in the destination country D 11 ): Consider a change of the coinsurance rate in the destination country and its implications for the source country. An increase of the coinsurance rate in the destination country D decreases the demand for the drug, as price elasticity increases:
As a result, the manufacturer lowers the drug price:
leaving the e¤ective consumer price unchanged
Consequently, the quantity consumed is unchanged
Graph 2 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase of the coinsurance rate under segmented markets, i.e. monopoly, and for marginal cost of zero. Let D ( = 0:2) denote the demand curve for a coinsurance rate of = 0:2 and M R ( = 0:2) the corresponding marginal revenue curve. Similarly, let D ( = 0:25) and M R ( = 0:25) denote the demand curve and marginal revenue curve respectively for a coinsurance rate of = 0:25. An increase of the coinsurance rate from = 0:2 to = 0:25 increases price elasticity of demand (inward turn of the demand curve) and makes the manufacturer lower the price from p to p 0 . This compensates the increase in the coinsurance rate completely and quantity consumed remains unchanged. Marginal cost of zero implies that the manufacturer sells a quantity up to a marginal revenue of zero. This corresponds to the intersection of marginal revenue curve and the x-axis, which is independent of changes in the coinsurance rate. 13 In other words, as the e¤ective consumer price is independent of the coinsurance rate, so is the quantity consumed. 1 2 Note that the e¤ective consumer price H p b;H = 1 2 is independent of the coinsurance rate. 1 3 As an increase of the coinsurance turns the demand curve and does not a¤ect the quantity demanded at a price of zero (intersection of the x-axis and the demand curve), also the intersection of the marginal revenue curve and the x-axis (marginal cost of zero) remains unchanged. A lower drug price at an unchanged quantity consumed reduces public health expenditure:
As the manufacturer's pricing decisions are independent under segmented markets, the drug price and the quantity consumed in the source country S are independent of (changes of) the coinsurance rate in the destination country D:
In other words, there are no spillovers of changes in the destination country to the source country.
Change in the source country
Consider now a change of the coinsurance rate in the source country and its implications for the destination country.
Similarly, an increase of the coinsurance rate in the destination country S increases price elasticity of demand and thus decreases demand for the drug:
Consequently, the intermediary lowers the drug price:
leaving the e¤ective consumer price unchanged:
Also the quantity consumed is unchanged:
A lower drug price reduces public health expenditure:
As the manufacturer's pricing decisions are independent under segmented markets, the drug price and the quantity consumed in the destination country D are independent of (changes of) the coinsurance rate in the source country S:
In other words, there are no spillovers of changes in the source country to the destination country. To summarize, without parallel trade, an increase in the coinsurance rate in either country has no e¤ect on e¤ective consumer prices and the quantity consumed, but reduces health expenditure, and has no e¤ect on consumers or health expenditure in the other country. lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed, and raises health expenditure in the source country S.
In the destination country, the increase of the coinsurance rate results in lower drug prices and lower quantities sold.
An increase of the coinsurance rate in country D decreases demand for the locally sourced version of the drug c.p.:
For the parallel import, demand increases, if the price di¤erence between the locally sourced version and the parallel import exceeds the quality di¤erence:
The direct e¤ect of the price for the locally sourced version on the price for the parallel import, however, leads to a decrease of the price for the parallel import as well 15 . This is demonstrated by the best response function: p ;D = 1 2 w + p b;D (1 ) . Accordingly, in country D both drug prices decrease in the coinsurance rate:
Competition and higher price elasticity under parallel trade of demand limits the ability to increase prices in response to an increase of the coinsurance rate and consequently, e¤ective consumer prices increase:
As price decreases cannot compensate the e¤ect of lower demand, quantities of both versions 1 5 In addition, 39 implies that the intermediary has to lower p ;H in order to prevent a decrease of demand.
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of the drug decrease in D :
2 S D (1 ) (9 5 ) ( + 3) 2 6 D (9 5 ) + S D (9 5 ) (1 )
Spillovers of copayment changes in country D to the source country S occur via the wholesale price. As the decrease of total demand in country D reduces the e¤ect of competition, the double marginalization e¤ect gains relative importance and, accordingly, the manufacturer lowers the wholesale price: @w @ D = 8 (9 5 ) 2 (1 )
A decrease of the wholesale price then results in drug price decrease in country S:
Health expenditure increases, as the e¤ect from a higher quantity consumed exceeds the e¤ect of a lower drug price (see Appendix C):
Change in the source country
Consider now a change of the cost-sharing instrument in the source country and its implications for the destination country. An increase in the coinsurance rate in the source country S raises e¤ective consumer prices, lowers the quantity consumed and reduces health expenditure in the source country S and lowers e¤ective consumer prices, increases the quantity consumed and lowers health expenditure in the destination country country D.
Demand for the drug decreases c.p.: (92) The e¤ective drug price increases, as marginal cost is no longer zero 16 :
Similar to the e¤ect of an increase of the copayment in country D on drug prices and quantities 1 6 Note that
That is, if w = 0, the e¤ective consumer price is independent of the coinsurance rate; if w > 0, an increase of the coinsurance rate implies an increase of the e¤ective consumer price. in country D, the increase of the copayment in country S results in a lower drug price and a lower quantity sold, which decreases health expenditure: < 0:
Spillovers of copayment changes in country S to the destination country D again occur via the wholesale price.
As the quantity reduction increases in the wholesale price, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price:
In country D, the decrease of the wholesale price results in a lower price for the parallel import. This induces the manufacturer to reduce also the price for the locally sourced version of the drug in order not to lose too many consumers to the parallel import. Accordingly, in country D, both drug prices decrease in the coinsurance rate in the source country:
As the e¤ect of lower prices more than o¤sets the e¤ect of a higher quantity, public health expenditure decreases:
Appendix D: Change in Health Expenditure
Under segmented markets, public drug expenditure in the destination country is given as
and public health expenditure in the source country is given as:
Under parallel trade, public drug expenditure in the destination country amounts to 
Increase of health expenditure in the source country following from an increase of the coin-surance rate in the destination country Decrease of health expenditure in the destination country following from an increase of the coinsurance rate in the source country 
Appendix E: Implications for Health Policy
Total welfare in the destination country is given as: :
Total welfare in the source country is given as: 2 )( +3) 2 +8 D (5 9) 2 ) , b= 48 2 D ( 1)( +3) 2 (5 9) 2 (27 4 + 2 )(1 ) 2 ((1 )(9 16
2 )( +3) 2 +8 D (5 9) 2 ) and c= 64 3 D (5 9) 3 (27 4 + 2 )(1 ) 2 ((1 )(9 16
2 )( +3) 2 +8 D (5 9) 2 ) .
Total welfare for both countries is given as: 
